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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. FACTUAL EVENTS 
Respondent, hereinafter "Buku", entered into two separate contracts l 2 with elderly 
couples3, hereinafter "Clark" and "Peterson". The contracts entered into by Buku \vith the 
appellants were nearly identical and both contracts depended on the complete sale of the 
real property of both Clark and Peterson to Buku. The contracts \vere intertwined to allow 
for the complete purchase of the adjoining property of both Clark and Peterson4• The Clark 
property consisted of 80.17 acres and a home; and, the Peterson property consisted of 
approximately 73 acres and a home. The elderly couples were using the sale of the real 
property for their retirement years. Each property was to be purchased for the following 
sum: Clark-$1,044,075.18; Peterson-$980,000.00.5 
The two contracts were almost identical in nature. The major difference was the 
earnest money payment. The Clarks received $25,000.00 of earnest money; the Petersons 
received $327,000.00 of earnest money. The difference was the need, which was expressed 
to respondent (Buku), of the Petersons' desire to purchase a retirement townhouse in Idaho 
Falls, Idaho. The Peterson townhouse was purchased with the earnest money and was a 
known fact to all parties to the action. The Petersons relied upon the representations of 
plaintiff in accepting the down payment. 
I The Clark contract is contained at pages 89-94 of the record. 
2 The Peterson contract is contained at pages 95-100 of the record. 
3 Janet C. Clark is now deceased; Betty Jean Peterson has cancer which may be terminaL 
4 See paragraph 25 of each contract. (R. pp 93, 99). 
5 R. pp. 89, 100. 
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The Clarks received a modest down payment to sell their real property to the 
defendant and moved to Texas to begin their retirement plans. Neither set of defendants 
believed any contingencies existed and that the contract was to be completed by a date 
certain for them to begin retirement activities. 
The parties entered into preliminary negotiations and, ultimately, signed the 
contracts prepared by the respondent on August 30,2007.6 The closing date \vas established 
at December 21, 2007. The reason for the delay in closing was to allow the respondent to do 
its "due diligence". Both contracts contained paragraph 3 of the "due diligence" language.7 
Due diligence or the conditions thereof are not explained in said paragraph. 
The real estate purchase agreements state the terms and conditions. 
Defendants/ appellants relied upon multiple promises of payment by the 
respondent/plaintiffs to the appellants/defendants-even subsequent to the closing date of 
the transactions. The appellants did not participate with Buku's bank process nor were the 
appellants involved in any actions of respondent concerning financing. 
No conditions were placed upon the sale of the real property as it related in any way, 
shape or form as to the County of Jefferson and any zoning or building requirements. The 
6 R. pp. 93, 100. 
7 Paragraph 3 of both contracts contains the following language: 3. Buyer's Obligations. 
Buyer is obligated to pay the earnest money as set forth in this agreement and pay the 
remaining purchase price at the timOe of closing. Prior to closing, it is Buyer's obligation to 
make sure that they are fully satisfied with the condition of the property, also any 
requirements, environmental requirements, and all of the requirements that the Buyer needs 
to make for its due diligence purposes. Buyer \vill have four months to perform the due 
diligence inspections to satisfy Buyer's interests and concerns regarding the purchase. 
Thus, closing will be on or before December 21, 2007. 
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intent of usage by plaintiff for the subject real properties was irrelevant to the appellants. 
No mutual agreement or understanding was made by the appellants as to the ultimate 
usage of the real property being purchased by the respondent. In fact, the only 
understanding \vas that the down payment to Petersons was critical to their purchase of a 
retirement home in Idaho Falls. Respondent \vas well aware of the zoned property as it met 
\vith Jefferson County prior to the closing date on December 10, 2007.8 Both set of 
appellants continued to be ready, able and willing to perform on the sale and were ready, 
willing and able to close at the closing date and subsequent to the closing date. 
BUh."ll failed to close on December 21, 2007. The legal disputes revolve around 
paragraph 3 of the 1\vo contracts with the appellants; and, the use of the earnest money by 
Peterson. Buku alleged that there were zoning issues on the real properties. Appellants 
contend no such issues existed as the zoning never changed during the entire process.9 The 
contracts are silent on such language. 
2. LEGAL EVENTS 
Ten months after the expiration of the closing date for the sale of the 1\vo real 
properties, Buku signed it complaint for return of earnest money on October 15, 2008 and 
filed the same with the Jefferson County court system. 1O The complaint alleged refund of 
earnest money; conversion; unjust enrichment; a pre-judgment interest request; along with a 
8 R. pp. 148. Affidavit of Foster: Pre-application meeting shows December 10,2007 and 
lots are zoned I-acre, 
9 R. pp. 144-146. 
to R. p.12. 
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request for fees and costs. ll Appellants filed an answer and counter-claim on December 10, 
2008.12 The counter-claim contained requests for specific performance of the contract; 
breach of contract; unjust enrichment; estoppel; promissory estoppel/detrimental reliance; 
consumer protection violations, along with a request for fees and costs. 
Approximately one year after the complaint was filed, respondent, Buku, filed a 
request for summary judgment.13 Clark and Peterson filed a denial of the request for 
summary judgment and objection to respondent's request along with the appellants' motion 
for summary judgment.14 Additionally, a motion to strike portions of the respondent's 
affidavits was filed by appellants.15 
District Judge Gregory Moeller was the sitting judge at the time and made a ruling 
denying summary judgment to respondents; and, did not consider the motion for summary 
judgment of appellants. 16 He did opine, however, that the contracts \vith Clark and Peterson 
b · 17 were unam IgUOUS. 
DistrictJudge Dane Watkins was appointed to the bench and was presented this first 
case from Jefferson County. The respondents, thereafter, filed a second motion for 
summary judgment. IS Appellants contested the motion with memorandum and various 
II R. pp. 12-22. 
12 R. pp. 33-45. 
13 R. pp. 64-65. 
14 R. pp. 114-118. 
15 R. pp. 119-121. 
16 R. pp. 197-210. 
17 R. pp. 203-205. 
18 R. pp. 290-292. 
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affidavits. 19 Judge \Vatkins granted summary judgment 20to the respondent, Buku, on all 
issues and denied any of the counter-claim responses of the appellants, Clark and Peterson. 
Appellants timely appealed to this court.21 This court suspended the document entitled 
"judgment" and remanded to the district court for a "final judgment in proper form".22 The 
respondent then filed a motion for fees, costs and pre-judgment interest. The request for 
fees, costs and interest would have been untimely but for the remand. Appellant objected.23 
The district judge then awarded fees, costs and pre- judgment interest to the 
summary judgment decision award in favor of Buku.24 The appellants then filed an 
amended appeal to this court.25 
ADDITIONAL ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. The Appellants request their costs and fees for the lo\ver court proceedings. 
2. The Appellants request their costs and fees on appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
1. SUMMARY 
Two mlings on summary judgment were submitted to the district court. Judge 
Gregory Moeller heard the first motion for summary judgment and denied the request. 
Judge Dane Watkins heard the second motion for summary judgment and granted the 
19 R. pp. 310-347. 
20 R. pp. 395-40S. 
2l R. pp. 409-412. 
~~ 
-- R. pp.434. 
23 R. pp 435-440. 
24 R. pp. 473-476. 
25 R. pp. 50S-50S. 
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request for the plaintiff/respondent. 
The two major arguments of the appellants are straight-fonvard and clear in nature 
and described hereafter. 
Both judges indicated the contracts in question were unambiguous. If so, then parol 
or evidence outside of the four corners of the contracts could not be considered. Both 
judges accepted information outside of the four corners of the contracts to render a 
decision. Thus, the contracts could not have been unambiguous. 
Judge Watkins accepted affidavit testimony of the respondents and did not accept 
affidavit testimony of the appellants. Summary judgment could not have been granted and 
the factual disputes would have to be determined by the fact-finder, to-wit: the jury. 
Appellants allege that the respondent breached the contracts; and, that summary 
judgment should have been granted in their favor. \Vorst case scenario, the appellants 
believe they should have had the opportunity to present their facts to the jury. 
Judge Watkins then granted a monetary judgment; added prejudgment interest along 
with costs and fees. 
The two major issues surround the "unambiguous" contract; and, the earnest money 
used by Peterson for their retirement to\-vnhome. 
Summary judgment is proper when "the pleadings, depositions, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law." 1.R.c.P. 56(c) (2002). In a motion for 
summary judgment, this Court should liberally construe all facts in favor of 
the nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the 
nonmoving party. Northwest Bee-Corp v. Home Living Serv., 136 Idaho 835, 
838-39,41 P.3d 263, 266-67 (2002). Summary judgment must be denied if 
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reasonable persons could reach differing conclusions or draw conflicting 
inferences from the evidence presented. 
Iron Eagle Development, LLC v. Quality Design Systems, Inc., 65 P.3d 509, 138 
Idaho 487, (Idaho 2003) 
------------ Excerpt from page 65 P.3d 513. 
2. INTRODUCTION. 
The first major issue surrounding this case is the interpretation and application of a 
due "diligence clause" contained in both of the contracts before this court. That language 
is as follows: 
3. Buyer's Obligations. Buyer is obligated to pay the earnest money as set 
forth in this agreement and pay the remaining purchase price at the time of 
closing. Prior to closing, it is Buyer'S obligation to make sure that they are 
fully satisfied with the condition of the property, also any requirements, 
environmental requirements, and all of the requirements that the Buyer needs 
to make for its due diligence purposes. Buyer will have four months to 
perform the due diligence inspections to satisfy Buyer's interests and 
concerns regarding the purchase. Thus, closing will be on or before 
December 21, 2007. 
This non-artfully drafted language is so vague that it would be impossible for any 
court to know what "buyer needs for its due diligence." Paragraph 24 of the contracts is very 
clear that the buyer drafted this agreement. 26 As the court is well a\vare, the court must 
construe the language against the drafter. 
(See, e.g., RESTATEMENT, supra, at § 201 (agreement interpreted in 
accordance with the meaning assigned by the more "innocent" of the 
parties); Luzar v. Western Surety Co., 107 Idaho 693, 692 P.2d 337 (1984) 
(where trier of fact is unable to determine the intent of the parties, preference 
is given to the meaning which operates against the party drafting the 
agreement); RESTATEMENT, supra, at § 207 (preferring an interpretation 
?6 
- R. pp. 93, 99. 
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favoring the public interest). 
USA Fertilizer, Inc. v. Idaho First Nat. Bank7 815 P.2d 469, 120 Idaho 271, (Idaho 
App.1991) 
------------ Excerpt from page 815 P.2d 474. 
The second major issue before this court concerns the earnest money agreement and 
the Petersons' purchase of the retirement townhome from the earnest money. No question 
exists that this purchase of townhome was a major factor in the sale contracts. It is evident 
this event was major and can determined from the earnest money to Clarks of $25,000.00 
and the comparing earnest money to Petersons of $327,000.00. 
3. THE RESPONDENT BREACHED THE CONTRACTS WITH APPELLANTS 
AND THE INTENT OF SUCH CONTRACTS. THE LOWER COURT COULD NOT 
SUPPLEMENT UNAMBIGUOUS CONTRACTS. 
Case law in Idaho is well defined on the interpretation of contracts and is illustrated 
with the following: 
The primary objective in constming a contract is to discover the intent 
of the parties, and in order to effectuate this objective, the contract must be 
vie\ved as a whole and considered in its entirety. The primary consideration 
in interpreting an ambiguous contract is to determine the intent of the parties. 
The determination of a contract's meaning and legal effect are questions of 
law to be decided by the court where the contract is clear and unambiguous. 
However, where a contract is determined to be ambiguous, the interpretation 
of the document presents a question of fact \vhich focuses upon the intent of 
the parties. The determination of whether a contract is ambiguous or not is a 
question of law over which we may exercise free review, and in determining 
whether a contract is ambiguous, our task is to ascertain \vhether the contract 
is reasonably subject to conflicting interpretation. 
Bondy v. Levy, 121 Idaho 993, 996-97, 829 P.2d 1342,1345-46 (1992). 
A. The first summary judgment motion mled upon by Judge Gregory Moeller. 
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The first motion for summary judgment bet\veen the parties resulted in a decision 
from Judge Gregory Moeller denying summary judgment to either party. He opined that 
the contracts in question were not ambiguous. Thus, the court could not accept any 
information outside of the four corners of the contract to interpret the meaning of the 
contracts. The court did not do that as can be determined by his references to the 
information contained in affidavits of both parties.27 If the contracts are unambiguous, 
outside information and/or parol evidence is irrelevant. Furthermore, the district court, in 
this first decision, focused on the earnest money provision and not the due diligence clause 
\vhich are the t\vo major issues before this court. 
Under Idaho's parol evidence mle, where preliminary negotiations are 
consummated by written agreement, the writing supercedes all previous 
understandings and the intent of the parties must be ascertained from the 
writing. Nuquist v. Bauscher, 71 Idaho 89, 94, 227 P.2d 83, 86 (1951). This 
rule, however, applies only when the integrated character of the writing is 
established. Whether a particular subject of negotiation is embodied in the 
writing depends on the intent of the parties, revealed by their conduct and 
language, and by the surrounding circumstances. Nysingh v. lVarren, 94 
Idaho 384, 385, 488 P.2d 355, 356 (1971). The mere existence of a document 
does not establish integration. Id. A "merger" clause in a written agreement 
is one means of proving the integrated character of a writing. Tapper 
Chevrolet Co. v. Hansen, 95 Idaho 436, 510 P.2d 1091 (1973). 
Katseanes v. Yamagata, 653 P.2d 1185,103 Idaho 773, (Idaho App. 1982) 
------------ Excerpt from page 653 P.2d 1187. 
The trial court's finding that the contract was ambiguous is a question 
of law. ll7.,ltson Construction Co. v. Reppel Steel & Slpply, 123 Ariz. 138, 598 
P.2d 116 (Ariz.App.1979). When presented with an issue that raises only a 
question of law, this Court is not bound by the findings of the trial court, but 
is free to draw its own conclusions from the evidence presented. Sharp v. 
27 E.g. See footnotes 1-7 of the court's decision. R. pp.198-199, 203, 206. 
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Hoerner !f7.'lldorfCorp., 584 P.2d 1298 (Mont.1978). See Harding v. Home 
Investment & Savings Co., 49 Idaho 64,286 P. 920 (1930). 
The respondent cites Werry v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 97 Idaho 130, 
540 P.2d 792 (1975), for the proposition that the trial court's finding of 
ambiguity must be respected on appeal. However, as shown by the analysis 
in Werry, the question of an ambiguity in a contract is separate from the 
question concerning the interpretation of an ambiguous contract. In Werry, 
we only held that, "where the terms of a contract are ambiguous its 
interpretation and meaning is a fact question to be determined by the jury." 
Id. at 135, 540 P.2d at 797, citing National Produce Distributors v.lIBles & 
Jl;[eyer, 75 Idaho 460, 274 P.2d 831 (1954). 
Clark v. St. Palll Property and Liability Ins. Companies~ 639 P.2d 454, 102 Idaho 756, 
(I daho 1981) 
------------ Excerpt from page 639 P.2d 455. 
"Whether a contract is ambiguous is a question of la\V over which we 
exercise free review." Howard v. Perry, 141 Idaho 139, 142, 106 P .3d 465, 468 
(2005). Ambiguities can be either patent or latent. "Idaho courts look solely 
to the face of a written agreement to determine whether it is [patently] 
ambiguous." Ward v. Puregro Co., 128 Idaho 366, 369, 913 P.2d 582, 585 
(1996). Accord, Vc-zlley Bank v. Christensen, 119 Idaho 496, 808 P.2d 415 (1991). 
"A latent ambiguity is not evident on the face of the instmment alone, but 
becomes apparent when applying the instmment to the facts as they exist." 
In re Estate of Kirk, 127 Idaho 817, 824, 907 P.2d 794,801 (1995). 
Swanson v. Beco Canst. CO'7 Inc., 175 P.3d 748, 145 Idaho 59, (Idaho 2007) 
------------ Excerpt from page 175 P.3d 751. 
Thus, the court determines if language in a contract is ambiguous. If a contract or 
clause is not ambiguous, the court must stay \vithin the four corners of the contract and may 
not consider evidence not contained in such contract. If the contract is ambiguous, the fact-
finder determines the facts to consider the ambiguous language and application thereof. 
\vhen the terms of a contract are unambiguous, interpretation of the 
contract and its legal effect are questions of la\v. Opportunity7 L.L.c. v. 
Ossewarde, 136 Idaho 602, 605,38 P.3d 1258,1261 (2002) (citing Idaho v. 
Hosey, 134 Idaho 883, 886, 11 P.3d 1101, 1104 (2000». An unambiguous 
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contract will be given its plain meaning, \vhich is based on the words of the 
contract. Id. The purpose of interpreting a contract is to determine the 
mutual intent of the contracting [138 Idaho 492] parties at the time the 
contract was entered. Id. at 607, 38 P.3d at 1263. If a contract is determined 
ambiguous, its interpretation is a question of fact. Elec. Wholesale Supply 
Co., Inc. v. Nielson, 136 Idaho 814, 823,41 P.3d 242,251 (citing State v. 
Bamett, 133 Idaho 231, 234, 985 P.2d 111, 114 (1999». 
Iron Eagle Development, LLC v. Quality Design Systems, Inc., 65 P.3d 509, 138 
Idaho 487, (Idaho 2003) 
------------ Excerpt from pages 65 P.3d 513-65 P.3d 514. 
The due diligence clause [paragraph 3 of the contracts] is overly broad by both the 
appellants' opinion and the first court decision.28 The contract, paragraph 3 clause: "they 
[Buku] are fully satisfied with the condition of the property, also any requirements, 
environmental requirements, and all of the requirements that the Buyer needs to make for 
its due diligence purposes" is unquestionably overly broad. Also, it is capable of various 
meanings and "all requirements" could include almost anything in the realm of possibility. 
No questions exist that the condition of the property was not an issue. No questions 
exist as to environmental concerns as being a non-issue. Thus, the first portion of the due 
diligence language is not before the court. 
What do "all of the requirements of the Buyer" mean? Nothing in the contract 
discusses land uses, zoning, financing, water rights, title issues, disasters, eminent domain 
or many of the "normal" concerns when purchasing real property. The contract appears to 
have an overly broad catch-all contained in "all of the requirements" phrase. 
The respondents have made no claim, whatsoever, that any problem existed with the 
28 See, Judge Moeller's statement in the decision at R. p. 205, first paragraph. 
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real property of both Clark and Peterson. The ONLY claim asserted by Buku is that the 
property could potentially be re-zoned. Rhetorically asked: How could the district court 
even come up with this kno\vledge unless outside information was considered? If the 
contracts are unambiguous, the court had to rely purely on the contracts and not consider 
any outside information by way of affidavit or otherwise. It would be impossible to know of 
Buku's claim of zoning issues by viewing the information within the four corners of the 
contracts. Further, the purpose of Bulm's purchase is never disclosed in the contracts. 
How could the court even know if zoning was a concern on the use of the property by 
respondents if zoning \vas never mentioned or contained in the "unambiguous" contracts? 
Thus, the reasoning on the first decision of Judge Moeller had to be in error. The 
result denying summary judgment was acceptable to the appellants. The reasoning on the 
first decision, however, may have affected the result on the second ruling by Judge Watkins. 
That court needed additional information to interpret Paragraph 3; and, it would need to be 
supplemented to determine its meaning and application. Therefore, a portion of paragraph 
3 of the contracts had to be ambiguous. 
Like\vise the agreement with Peterson on the earnest money of $327,000.000, for the 
purchase of the townhome for retirement, would require supplementation from affidavit, 
parol evidence or other supplemental evidence to determine the intent of the parties. Thus, 
Judge Moeller was correct that summary judgment could not be granted. Summary 
judgment could not be granted. The appellants agree with the result of Judge Moeller; but 
disagree with the reasoning to reach the result. Therefore, the district court's reasoning to 
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determine summary judgment \vas not appropriate but the denial of summary judgment 
\vas in accord \vith appellants' belief. The reasoning to reach the end result is disputed by 
appellants. 
Every party to this transaction knew the property was zoned R-1 (residential-one 
acre) at the time the contracts \vere contemplated, signed and completed. Every party to 
this transaction knew the property was also zoned R-1 at the scheduled closing date. Also, 
Buku was reassured that the subjects properties would be grandfathered and continued to 
be zoned R_l/9 at all times before the contract, during the contract to closing; and, after the 
transaction was completed. 
The contracts are silent on the use of the property that was to be purchased by the 
respondents. Although, the appellants kne\v that the respondent were real estate 
speculators and developers, nothing was contained in the contracts about the proposed 
usage by respondents. Once again, the court would need to go outside of the contracts to 
determine such additional facts. 
Since the two contracts did not close on December 21, 2007, appellants believe that 
the contracts were breached by the respondents. No reasonable explanation can be given 
for not closing the transactions. The potential for re-zone was not contained in the 
contracts and, more important, was a non-issue because the property was not re-zoned or 
contemplated to be re-zoned. This non-issue is a red herring developed by the respondent. 
If, in fact, the respondents were known developers, Buku had extensive knowledge 
29 See affidavit of Foster with attachments. R. pp. 144-153. See also Affidavit of Peterson. 
R. pp. 139-140, par. 11, 14,21. 
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that the land \vould be "grandfathered" by their applications to Jefferson County, Idaho for 
development. Buku had actual knowledge that the property would remain R-1 by its 
December 10, 2007 meeting \vith the Jefferson County official, Naysha Foster.30 The 
respondents \vere re-assured of this position although Buku already possessed such 
knowledge. 31 No legitimate explanation can be given for the breach by Buku. 
The court, in this first ruling, never addressed the summary judgment motion filed 
by appellants.32 The court in its decision states: "This decision addresses Buku's 
motion.,,33 Thus, the court never considered the appellants' motion for summary judgment 
although it \vas presented, briefed and argued to the court. The breach by Buku should 
have entitled Clark and Peterson to summary judgment. Appellants gained no guidance on 
their motion or the potential factual issues to be presented to a jury. 
This first decision included the court's opinion that more facts need to be 
ascertained on the conduct of the parties subsequent to the closing date. Admittedly, no 
\vritten contracts or written amendments \vere entered into by the parties after the failed 
closing date. HO\vever, verbal assurance were given on multiple occasions that the contract 
would be fulfilled and that the Petersons did not need to worry about their earnest money 
used to purchase the townhome . .3-f 
Moreover, the parties had relied on the original contracts and both had begun partial 
'0 
J R. p.148. 
3l R. p. 148. the pre-application meeting with Jefferson County occurred on December 10, 
r:P07 and Buku KNE\V (Emphasis Supplied) that the property was grandfathered at R-l. 
R. pp. 116-117. 
33 R. p. 199. 
'4 
J Peterson affidavit, R. pp. 137-143. 
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performance based upon such contracts. Subsequent to the failed closing, the respondent 
continued to exercise dominion and control over the Peterson property.35 
B. The second summary judgment motion filled upon by Judge Watkins. 
The second filling on summary judgment \vas conducted by Judge Watkins. The 
lower court also filled the contracts were unambiguous. The same reasoning applies as 
above. How could the judge know of zoning if it \vas not contained in the four comers of 
the contracts? How could the judge know of the intended use if it \vas not contained in the 
four comers of the contracts? The court could not. Paragraph 3 had to be interpreted \vith 
parol evidence from the affidavits by the lower court. This procedure would violate existing 
case law as set forth above. Clark v. St. Paul Property and Liability Ins. Companies, 639 P.2d 
454, 102 Idaho 756, (Idaho 1981); S~vanson v. Beco Const. Co., Inc., 175 P.3d 748, 145 Idaho 
59, (Idaho 2007). 
The district court did not consider the affidavits of the appellants on the earnest 
money arrangement. If so, the court would have determined that a factual dispute existed 
as to the use of the $327,000.00 for the Peterson purchase of the townhouse in Idaho Falls, 
Idaho. Summary judgment could not have been granted. A fact-finder would need to 
determine the surrounding conduct and intent of the parties. In the first decision, Judge 
Moeller recognized this reality. The second filling by Judge Watkins ignored this fact. 
The lower court supplemented the contracts with evidence from the affidavits on the 
35 R. pp. 137-143; 329-347; (both Peterson affidavits from 1st and 2nd decisions]. 
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zoning issue but failed to supplement the contracts \vith evidence from the affidavits on the 
issue of the earnest money. The lower court should have been obligated to consider 
evidence both ways-not just to the advantage of the respondents. 
Examples of the lower court accepting additional testimony on the zoning and use 
issues include, but are not limited, as follows: 
... both the Clark Property and the Peterson Property (hereinafter collectively 
Properties) were zoned Residential-l ("R-l"), which would allow a minimum 
density of one acre lots. (R. p. 396). 
During the four month diligence period, Buku learned of a proposed 
zoning change, which might have affected the Properties. (R. p. 396). 
Between August 30, 2007 and December 18, 2007, issues arose regarding 
the Jefferson County Planning and Zoning Commission's plans to possibly 
change the zoning categorization of the Properties to R-S. The change which 
would allow a minimum density of five acre lots could have potentially 
decreased the value of the Properties. (R. p. 396). 
See also, first two paragraphs, R. p. 397. 
In its decision, the court improperly states: "Neither party asserts the Agreements 
are ambiguous.,,36 This statement is incorrect. Judge Moeller stated the agreements were 
unambiguous. 
Appellants stated that a portion of paragraph 3 of the agreements was not 
ambiguous, to-wit: 1. condition of the property, and 2. environmental concerns. However, 
the phrase "and all of the requirement that the Buyer needs ... " certainly is overly broad, 
ambiguous and capable of multiple meanings. 
The court also accepted the "red herring" when it stated: "Thus, the Agreements 
36 R.p.401. 
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permitted Buku to look into potential (emphasis supplied) zone changes that \vould affect 
its 'interests and concerns' ".37 If there were no possibility of zone changes, there could be 
no effect on Buku. Buku knew that the real property was grandfathered. Once again, 
ho\vever, ho\v could the court even know that a zone change was an issue without accepting 
evidence outside of the four-corners of the contracts.38 If the lower court were to accept 
outside evidence, shouldn't it also have accepted outside evidence on the issue of the 
earnest money provided to Peterson for the townhome? The court needs to treat both 
parties on an equal basis. The court's reasoning is inconsistent with an unambiguous 
contract. 
In footnote 4, R. p. 403, the 100ver court commits major error by stating: "'while the 
court acknowledges the above facts, the record reflects that the 'grandfathering' issue was 
not addressed by Jefferson County until March 2008, three months after the December 21, 
2007 closing date." That statement is totally untrue. The pre-application subdivision 
meeting with Buku occurred on December 10, 2007 and specifically stated: "Lot Size: 1 acre 
building lots." See, R. p. 148 [half way dO\vn the page the date and lot size are listed]. 
(Emphasis Supplied). Buku absolutely knew beyond any doubt that the real property in 
question was 1 acre lots (R-1). This knowledge was eleven (11) days before the scheduled 
closing and \vithin the four month time period for due diligence. 
In footnote 6, R. p. 405, the lower court commits additional error \vhen it dra\vs an 
inference in favor of respondent that was a jury mission by stating: "Based upon the 
37 3 R. p. 40 . 
38 See footnote 4, R. p. 403. 
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affidavits and exhibits attached with Buku's submissions, the Court questions whether the 
"dominion and control" arguments asserted by the Clarks and Petersons would be 
established." The court continually accepts supplemental evidence to support the 
"unambiguous" contracts and ignores any presentations of evidence by the appellants on 
the issue of paragraph 3 or on the issue of the earnest money usage. The appellants 
requested a jury tria1.39 The jury is the fact-finder not the court. 
Judge Moeller noted that "Buku may not be entitled to recover under the 
unambiguous contracts".40 Judge \Vatkins referred to such language and then went on to 
form an opinion that the subsequent dealings had to be in writing. Once again, if the 
contracts were unambiguous, how "vould the evidence presented by affidavit affect the 
validity of the "unambiguous contracts". 41 
The subsequent dealings reiterate that the contract was still valid and that appellant 
was going to honor its terms.42 Respondent continually reiterated that the contract would be 
fulfilled after the closing date. The jury needs to interpret these dealings and determine 
whether the original contracts had been re-ratified. In any event, summary judgment in 
favor of Buku was incorrect. 
4. THE LOWER COURT IMPROPERLY DISMISSED THE COUNTER-CLAIMS 
OF THE APPELLANTS. 
39 R. p. 44. 
40 First Memorandum Decision, R. pp. 205-206; Judge \Vatkins recognized such fact. R. p. 
404. 
41 -R. pp. 404-40;,. 
42 R. pp. 137-143; 329-347; [both Peterson affidavits from 1st and 2nd decisions] 
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Appellants various counter-claims were summarily dismissed by the Im-ver court in 
the second decision by Judge Watkins.43 The lower court cited Bates v. Seldon, 146 Idaho 
772, 203 P.3d 702 (2009); Iron Eagle Development, LLC v. Quality Design Systems, Inc., 138 
Idaho 487, 65 P.3d 509 (2003) incorrectly. 
First, if summary judgment is non-applicable because of the errors advance above, 
the counter-claims remain. Second, and just as important, in Bates and Iron Eagle, the 
lower court indicated that equity claims were not applicable because an adequate remedy at 
law existed. 
In the instant case, if the contract were held to be void or illusory, the appellants 
have no remedy at law for the use of their property by Buku, for the declarations made 
concerning the earnest money, for the dominion and control exercised by Buku over the 
property of appellants and for the damages and lost revenue caused by Buku. 
The counter-claims of appellants included specific performance, breach of contract, 
unjust enrichment, estoppel and detrimental reliance. [Consumer Protection Violations 
were properly dismissed by Judge Moeller in the first decision.]+t 
The equitable doctrines of unjust enrichment, estoppel and detrimental reliance 
apply if no contract is in force. In quoting Bates at 77~ the lower court clearly should have 
recognized that "The existence of an express agreement does not prevent the application of 
the doctrine of unjust enrichment." If this court adheres to the lower court's decision that 
the express contract between the parties is not enforceable (which the court found), then the 
-+3 R. pp. 406-407. 
44 R. pp. 207-208. 
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equitable remedies apply. 
Likewise, the lower court cited Iron Eagle at 492, for the same proposition. What the 
Imver court failed to recognize is that those cases had remedies at law. If the court, in the 
instant case, determines that the contract is cancelled and the earnest money should be 
returned, \vhere is the remedy for the damages for lost use of real property, for dominion 
and control over the appellant's property for nearly one year, for the expenses associated 
with the property which Buku controlled and other items? Where is the remedy for the 
expenses of moving to the townhome, the taxes, utilities, upkeep, and cost of such 
purchase? This purchase (of the townhome) was authorized by the respondent. 
The respondent should be estopped from asserting rights contrary to the 
representations made to the appellants. Estoppel ties into the detrimental reliance theory. 
Estoppel is defined as follows: 
Equitable estoppel requires 
(1) a false representation or concealment of a material fact made with actual or 
constmctive knowledge of the truth; 
(2) that the party asserting estoppel did not and could not have discovered the tmth; 
(3) an intent that the misrepresentation or concealment be relied upon; and 
(4) that the party asserting estoppel relied on the misrepresentation or concealment 
to his or her prejudice. 
Tndn Falls Clinic & Hosp. Bldg. Corp. v. Hamill, 103 Idaho 19,22,644 P.2d 341, 344 
(1982). 
E. Detrimental Reliance 
Allowing promissory estoppel as a substitute for consideration IS 
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permitted in those situations ,,,,here injustice would otherwise result. The 
reason for the doctrine also defines its limits. In order to allege the defense of 
promissory estoppel, it must be shown: (1) the detriment suffered in reliance 
was substantial in an economic sense; (2) the substantial loss to the promisee 
acting in reliance ,,,,as or should have been foreseeable by the promisor; and 
(3) the promisee must have acted reasonably in justifiable reliance on the 
promise as made. Simpson, Contracts § 42 (1954). 
See also, Restatement of Contracts, § 90. 
kIohr v. Shultz, 388 P.2d 1002, 86 Idaho 531, (Idaho 1964) 
------------ Excerpt from pages 388 P.2d 1008-388 P.2d 1009. 
The appellants, unquestionably, relied upon the assurances of the respondents. 
These items of damage, mentioned above, are not controlled by an express contract. 
Therefore, there was no adequate remedy at la,,,,. Judge Moeller, in the first ruling on 
summary judgment recognized these facts. The lower court, on the second ruling, failed to 
consider the reasoning of Judge Moeller in the first summary judgment memorandum 
decision. 
5. THE LOWER COURT IMPROPERLY RELIED UPON IDAHO CODE 9-503; 
AND, EQUITABLE REMEDIES WHICH WERE DISMISSED SHOULD NOT HAVE 
BEEN INCLUDED IN ANY SUMMARY JUDGMENT DECISION. 
The appellants have never alleged that a new written agreement existed after the 
closing date did not conclude this matter. The appellants do not dispute the clear written 
language of paragraph 21 ofthe contracts in question. Nor do Clark and Peterson dispute 
the statute of frauds language as contained in Idaho Code 9-503. The la,,,, is clear on those 
points and it is believed that the respondent has "missed the point" of the court's earlier 
ruling Uudge Moeller's first ruling]. 
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That court was stating that various facts exist to determine whether there is 
justification for return of earnest money. If there are not sufficient facts to enable Buku 
return of the earnest money, then the fact-finder needs to make such a determination. Both 
pre- and post- contracts, Buku has led the appellants to believe the sale would occur and the 
balance of money \vould be paid to Clark and Peterson. 
It is very clear that part-performance creates various remedies under the Statute of 
Frauds. The respondent began to perform on the promise to purchase. This case was not 
about zoning. The case has never been about the inability of zoning, despite the assertions 
of Buku, or any deficiency on the real properties; or, for that matter, the good faith and fair 
dealings of Clark and Peterson. 
Quite clearly, part performance is explained in more technical terms concerning the 
Statute of Frauds as follows: 
We turn to "part" performance. \Vhen we use this term, we mean 
performance by either or both parties of less than all their respective 
obligations under the contract. There is no literal foundation in I.e. § 9-505 
for the oft-made assertion that part performance takes a contract outside the 
statute. Plainly it does not. The contract is still within the statute. At least a 
portion of the contract remains "to be performed" on both sides. Compare 
I.e. § 9-504 (explicitly referring to part performance of land sale contracts 
under I.e. § 9-503). Rather, it is more accurate to say that in some 
circumstances, part performance may establish an equitable ground to avoid 
the strictures of the statute of frauds. 
In A11en v. lVloyle, 84 Idaho 18, 367 P.2d 579 (1961), discussing contracts for personal 
services, our Supreme Court implicitly recognized this point: 
[T]he equitable doctrine of part performance is not applicable to a contract ... 
within the statute of frauds.... The mere part performance of such a contract 
does not take it out of the operation of the statute or permit a recovery under 
the contract for any part of the contract remaining executory .... [T]o hold that 
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part performance is performance would be a nullification of the statute. 
Id. at 23, 367 P.2d at 582 (quoting 49 AM.JUR. § 497, at 798). Similarly, 
in International Business Machines Corp. v. Law11Orn, 106 Idaho 194, 198, 677 
P.2d 507, 511 (Ct.App.1984), we referred to part performance as a doctrine 
"grounded in equity." The doctrine of part performance is best understood 
as a specific form of the more general principle of equitable estoppel. 
Accordingly, we \vill return to it in the next section of this opinion. 
Hovering uneasily benveen full performance by both parties and part 
performance by either or both parties is a troublesome hybrid known as "full" 
performance by one party. American courts and commentators have long 
disagreed--\vith varying degrees of awareness and perception--as to whether 
such performance is akin to full performance by both sides (taking a contract 
outside the statute of frauds) or more closely resembles part performance 
(possibly allowing equitable relief from the statute). A majority of courts 
appear to hold the former vie\v. CALAMARI & PERILLO § 19-23; CORBIN 
§ 457; L. SIMPSON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 89 
(2d ed. 1965) (hereinafter SIMPSON); 73 AM.JUR.2D Statute of Frauds § 533 
(1974) (hereinafter Statute of Frauds). However, "no ... general principle can 
be derived from the decisions on this point." WILLISTON § 528. Thus. 
some COlirts have held that the statute of fi:auds does not avvlv to a contract 
::a.. ..... 
fuII.v executed on one side. where nothing remains to be done on the other 
side except to pay mone"v. See SIMPSON § 89. Courts adopting this view 
may order the contract to be enforced in damages. Other courts, taking an 
approach analogous to part performance, may consider an equitable or quasi-
contractual remedy, such as quantum merit. Id. 
Although the Idaho courts have not explicitly addressed this issue, our 
cases strongly point to the equity approach. The Idaho Supreme Court 
repeatedly has held that when one party has fully performed an oral contract 
within the statute of frauds, he is not entitled to collect damages for a breach. 
Rather, he is entitled to the equitable remedy of specific performance. E.g., 
Tew v. Manwaring, 94 Idaho 50, 480 P.2d 896 (1971); Quayle v. Mackert, 92 
Idaho 563, 447 P.2d 679 (1968). 
These cases put Idaho among a minority of states, but rye think the 
equity approach is sound. It offers greater consistency with the literal 
language of Idaho's [111 Idaho 10101 statute of frauds. For even if one side 
has fully performed a contract, the contract as a whole remains "to be 
performed. " Moreover, it is the nonperforming party who seeks protection 
under the statute. [In the instant case, the plaintiff, BukuJ. Conceptually, it 
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makes little sense to allow the extent of the opposing party's performance to 
determine whether the contract is within or without the statute. It makes 
greater sense. in our view. to examine the conduct of both parties. and the 
circumstances surrounding the alleged contract. to determine whether the 
par{v invoking the statute of frauds is eqllitabl,v entitled to do so. 
Accordingly, we hold that the doctrine of full performance by one party, like 
the doctrine of part performance, does not take the contract out of the statute 
of frauds. Rather, it should be treated as a form of equitable estoppeL 
(Emphasis supplied). 
Frantz v. Parke7 729 P.2d 1068, 111 Idaho 1005, (Idaho App. 1986) 
------------ Excerpt from pages 729 P.2d 1072-729 P.2d 1073. 
The doctrine of part performance ,vorks in conjunction with the doctrine of 
equitable estoppel. "Under Idaho law, part performance per se does not 
remove a contract from the operation of the statute of frauds. Rather, the 
doctrine of part performance is best understood as a specific form of the more 
general principle of equitable estoppel." Lettunich, 141 Idaho at 367, 109 P.3d 
at 1109. (citing Sword v. Sweet, 140 Idaho 242, 249, 92 P.3d 492, 499 (2004)). 
Equitable estoppel generally, and the doctrine of part performance 
speciJicall,v. assume the existence of a complete agreement. See Lettunich, 
141 Idaho at 367,109 P.3d at 1109. 
The language quoted above from cases in Idaho is precisely what the district court in 
its first ruling Uudge Moeller] ,vas referring to \vhen it stated: "the behavior of the parties" 
and similar language as stated therein. This language is identical to the issues propounded 
by the court cases as highlighted above. 
Respondent cannot rely upon mere allegations of zoning issues to defeat the 
contract. It has already been proven, through the Planning and Zoning Department, via 
Naysha Foster, that the real property would not be re-zoned.45 The contractual enforcement 
rights exist for the benefit of the appellants. The equitable remedies exist due to the 
aforementioned part performance theory. Those theories are contained in the counter-
45 R. pp. 144-153. 
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claims of appellants. 
Respondent misses the point of these facts \vhen arguing for its second summary 
judgment motion. These controverted facts show the surrounding nature of the 
circumstances of how Buku dealt; and, that such dealings were not in good faith. The 
controverted facts still do not solve the unresolved question of \vhether Buku could 
unilaterally terminate a contract, partially performed, by the assumption of zoning issues 
which were non-existent. The clear testimony contained in the record is that the zoning 
issue was a non-issue. Such fact has not been rebutted by Buku. 
Summary judgment on the second motion was clearly inappropriate. 
6. THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN ITS AWARD OF FEES, 
COSTS AND PREJUDGMENT INTEREST. 
The lower court issued a document entitled "JUDGMENT RE: MOTIONS FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT" dated February 3, 2011 . .f6 Rule 54 of the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure require that a request for fees, costs and/or other requests must be submitted 
within 14 days of a final judgment.47 The respondent filed its Memorandum on February 22, 
2011. Fourteen (14) days had expired prior to the filing. 
However, this Supreme Court suspended the appeal for "D.C. FINAL 
46 R. pp. 392-394. 
47 At any time after the verdict of a jury or a decision of the court, any party \",ho 
claims costs may file and serve on adverse parties a memorandum of costs, itemizing each 
claimed expense, but such memorandum of costs may not be filed later than fourteen (14) 
days after entry of judgment. 
IRCP Rule 54, Judgments. 
------------ Excerpt from page 169. 
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JUDGMENT". 48 The appellant appealed from the "Judgment" entered by the district 
court. The respondent failed to timely respond. This court then suspended the appeal and 
may have caused to become "moot" the timing of the 14 day response. 
This court held as follo'\vs: 
Rule 58(a) requires that" [e]very judgment shall be set forth on a 
separate document." That requirement was added to the Rules of Civil 
Procedure in 1992. Hunting v. Clark County School Dist. No. 161, 129 Idaho 
634,637,931 P.2d 628,631 (1997). "The purpose of this rule is to eliminate 
confusion about when the clock for an appeal begins to run. The separate 
document requirement was also designed to eliminate uncertainty over what 
actions of the district court are intended to be its judgment." 46 Am.Jur.2d 
Judgments § 70 (2006) (footnotes omitted). 
Spokane Structures7 Inc. v. Equitable Inv'7 LLC, 226 P.3d 1263, 148 Idaho 616, 
(Idaho 2010) 
------------ Excerpt from page 226 P.3d 1266. 
The judgment entered by the court and contained in the record is clearly set forth in 
a separate document and sets forth the time and date for the clock to begin running. As 
such, appellants believed the same was a final judgment. Respondent missed the time 
period to request fees and costs. (See footnote 44). 
However, other reasons exist for the denial of fees, costs and pre-judgment interest. 
Most notable, the appellants believe they are correct upon this appeal and the matter will be 
reversed. Absent that argument, the appellants still believe they are correct as stated 
hereafter. 
Buku requested a rescission of the contracts with Clark and Peterson which 
were for the sale of the real property. The lower court believed that Buku could rescind the 
48 R. pp. 432-433. 
APPELLfu~TS'BRIEF 26 
contract based upon a due diligence period contained in the contract nonvithstanding the 
lack of evidence associated \vith any zoning issues on the real property. In any event, the 
court granted summary judgment and the contract became a nullity. As such, there was no 
contract. Thus, no contractual basis exists for the a\vard of fees since there was "no 
contract" according to the grant of summary judgment. 
having dismissed the contract claims, the action could not have been 
one" to recover on a contract." \Ve affirmed the action of the trial court in 
Day, stating that "to recover attorney fees under the statute, the action must 
be one to recover on the contract, not merely an action arising from a 
transaction relating to the purchase or sale of goods." 115 Idaho at 1018, 772 
P.2d at 225. Based upon the interpretation of the statute in Day, the trial 
court's grant of attorney fees against appellants must be reversed; there being 
no contract between appellants 
Management Catalysts v. Turbo West Corpac~ Inc.~ 809 P.2d 487, 119 Idaho 626, 
(Idaho 1991) 
------------ Excerpt from page 809 P.2d 491. 
The same logic holds true for the claim of a commercial transaction under Idaho 
Code Section 12-120. If there is "no transaction" between the parties because the parties are 
returned to the status quo, then there is no basis for the award of fees. If the "Agreement" 
is rescinded, then no transaction occurred. Thus, no basis exists statutorily for the award of 
fees. 
"there is a clear distinction between litigation arising from a 
commercial transaction and litigation on noncommercial issues that might 
have future commercial ramifications." 117 Idaho at 424, 788 P.2d at 239. For 
reasons different from those given by the district judge, \ve conclude that an 
award of attorney fees in this case was not authorized under I.e. § 12-120(3). 
Edwards v. Edrvards, 842 P.2d 307,122 Idaho 971, (Idaho App. 1992) 
------------ Excerpt from page 842 P.2d 309. 
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This action before the court involved the future purchase of the real property. 
Although the appellants' disagree \vith the court's ruling on summary judgment, the case as 
it stands rescinded the contract and made the future purchase of the real property 
problematic. Future commercial ramifications do not come under the definition of 
commercial transactions to be able to award fees and costs. 
The lack of a contract or a statutory basis prohibits the award of fees and costs. 
With respect to the provision allowing attorney fees in a commercial 
transaction, the statute defines a commercial transaction as all transactions 
except transactions for personal and household purposes. This Court has 
held that the test is whether the commercial transaction comprises the 
gravamen of the lawsuit. Spence v. Howell, 126 Idaho 763, 890 P.2d 714 
(1995); Bro~ver v. [126 Idaho 900] E.L DuPont De Nemours and Co., 117 
Idaho 780, 792 P.2d 345 (1990). The gravamen of the lawsuit refers to whether 
the commercial transaction is integral to the claim and constitutes the basis 
upon which the party is attempting to recover. Brower, 117 Idaho at 784, 792 
P.2d at 349. 
Property Management U7est~ Inc. v. Hllnt~ 894 P.2d 130, 126 Idaho 897, (Idaho 1995) 
------------ Excerpt from pages 894 P.2d 132-894 P.2d 133. 
The claim for reimbursement by Buku was by rescinding the contract. By rescinding 
the contract to recover the earnest money, no contract existed and could not be, by the 
court's ruling, the gravamen of the lawsuit since a contract no longer existed and a 
commercial transaction no longer existed. Thus, fees cannot be awarded. 
No argument, of a reasonable nature, is made for fees pursuant to any other statute 
including Idaho Code 12-121. If so, the court should be convinced that nothing done by the 
appellants was unreasonable, frivolous or without foundation. 
Assuming arguendo that the court determines fees should be awarded, 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF 28 
reasonableness of fees is governed by Rule 54 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. The 
plaintiff should not be entitled to fees leading up to the ruling on summary judgment by this 
court. 
The appellants successfully defended the first summary judgment motion and all 
allegations until the second sitting judge made a ruling. Thus, all fees prior to the briefing 
on the latest summary judgment motion (second motion for summary judgment) should be 
denied. 
The appellants prevailed on the first motion and the events leading up to that 
decision. Thus, the respondents could not argue, in reasonable fashion, that it was entitled 
to fees until the date of July 8, 2010. (The date commencing the preparation for the second 
summary judgment motion.) Furthermore, the court did not accept the motions to strike, 
etc. and those matters should not be awarded for the unsuccessful attempt by Buku. Buku 
"vould only be entitled to 68.9 hours according to the affidavit of its attorney commencing 
July 8, 2010 until February 15, 2011. 
Fees and costs should not be awarded. However, if the contract is reinstated and the 
matter set for trial, all parties would then be subject to the contractual terms and the jury 
determina tion. 
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ADDITIONAL ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. THE APPELLANTS REQUESTS THEIR COSTS AND FEES AT HEARINGS IN 
THE LOWER COURT 
Justice Jesse R. Walters, Jr. in his updated primer of the former Lon Davis manual on 
the a\vard of attorney fees, A Primer For Awarding Attorney Fees in Idaho, Idaho Law 
Review, Volume 38, 2001, Number 1, indicates that the following steps are necessary for an 
award of fees and costs: 
A. A prevailing party; 
B. A statutory or contract basis for award of fees; and, 
C. Compliance with Rule 54 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
The respondents were not entitled to summary judgment and could not be a 
prevailing party. Second, the appellants were entitled to a ruling on their summary 
judgment motion that respondent breached the contracts. The appellants would have 
prevailed. 
Both judges accepted and considered evidence outside the four corners of the 
contracts despite a ruling such contracts and clauses contained in the contracts were 
unambiguous. The law does not allow such action. Clark v. St. Paul Property and Liability 
Ins. Companies~ 639 P.2d 454,102 Idaho 756, (Idaho 1981). 
Moreover, the documents were drafted by respondents and should have been 
construed against Buku. Additionally, the court must view the evidence in a light most 
favorable to Clark and Peterson. Smith v. Idaho State Credit Union, 103 Idaho 245, 646 P.2d 
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1016 (Ct. App. 1982); Banner Life Ins. Co. v. fr"lark Wallace DiYson Irrevocable Tnlst, 147 
Idaho 117, 206 P.3d 481 (2009). The court also was precluded from dra"\ving inferences in 
favor of the respondents since the court was not the fact-finder as this matter was scheduled 
for a jury trial. Sewell v. Neilson, lv[onroe, Inc., 109 Idaho 192, 706 P.2d 81 (Ct. App. 1985); 
Farnworth v Ratliff, 134 Idaho 337, 999 P.2d 892 (2000). 
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2. THE APPELLANTS REQUEST THEIR COSTS AND FEES ON APPEAL. 
An award of attorney fees on appeal requires a statutory or contractual basis. A 
contract exists in the case at bar \vith an attorney fee provision if this court reinstates the 
contract and remands the matter for trial. Appellants rely upon the contract and upon Idaho 
Code §§ 12-120; 12-121 and I.A.R., Rules 40 and 41 in their request for fees on appeal. 
Fees are awarded on appeal as follows: 
Section 12-120(3) of the Idaho Code requires that the court hearing any 
action arising out of a contract for services award reasonable attorney fees to 
the prevailing party. This Court has interpreted I.e. § 12-120(3) to mandate 
the award of attorney fees on appeal as well as at trial. Chemetics, 130 Idaho 
at 258,939 P.2d at 577 . 
. . . also asserts a right to attorney fees and costs on appeal based on 
I.A.R. 40, I.A.R. 41, I.e. § 12-120 and I.e. § 12-121. As stated above, this Court 
has held that I.e. § 12-120(3) mandates the award of attorney fees on appeal to 
the prevailing party. Additionally, costs are properly awarded to the 
prevailing party on appeal pursuant to I.A.R. 40. Sammis v. Magnetek, Inc., 
130 Idaho 342, 353, 941 P.2d 314, 325 (1997). 
Hummer v. Evans~ 979 P.2d 1188, 132 Idaho 830, (Idaho 1999) 
------------ Excerpt from page 979 P.2d 1191. 
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Fees should be awarded to appellant as a prevailing party pursuant to the contract, 
statutes cited, and Rule 54, LR.C.P. The lower court could not have made the findings and 
conclusions to support summary judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
The lower court could not supplement an "unambiguous" clause or contract with 
additional evidence not contained in the contracts. The intent of the parties is a factual 
question to be determined by the fact-finder. Respondent breached the contracts with the 
appellants. Fees and costs were not proper or properly considered. Pre-judgment interest 
\vas inappropriate. 
Fees and costs should be awarded to the appellants at trial and upon appeal. 
DATED this 7th day of November, 2011. 
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